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Agglomerama
Lee Anne Fennell*
The world’s population is rapidly becoming urbanized, and in a
matter of decades will be overwhelmingly so.1 Already, over eighty
percent of the U.S. population dwells in urban areas.2 The forces that
explain these trends, which can be placed under the general rubric of
agglomeration economies,3 present a newly pressing challenge for
students of commons dilemmas. How can urban space, and the property
rights that structure it, be organized in ways that will foster and capture
the positive externalities produced by proximity among people and land
uses, while controlling the negative spillovers produced by that same
proximity?
The problem is a tricky one. Because the raw ingredients of
collaboration and interaction—people, businesses, products, services,
venues—take up space and time, congestion vies with agglomeration
* Max Pam Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I thank Marcilynn Burke, Carol Rose,
David Schleicher, Lior Strahilevitz, Barton Thompson, Jr., and the participants in the 2014 BYU Law
Review Symposium on the Global Commons for helpful comments and questions. I am also grateful for
financial support from the Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan and Harold J. Green Faculty Funds and the Lynde
and Harry Bradley Foundation.
1. See U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIV., WORLD URBANIZATION
PROSPECTS, THE 2014 REVISION, HIGHLIGHTS, at 1, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/352 (2014), available at
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf (reporting that “54 per cent of the world’s
population resid[es] in urban areas in 2014” and that “by 2050, 66 per cent of the world’s population is
projected to be urban.”); Michael Batty, Commentary, When All the World’s a City, 43 ENV’T & PLAN. A
765, 767–78 (2011) (predicting that if current trends continue, “the entire world will be urbanised by
2092”).
2. Growth in Urban Population Outpaces Rest of Nation, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 26, 2012),
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb12-50.html (reporting, based on data
from the 2010 Census, that “[u]rban areas—defined as densely developed residential, commercial and other
nonresidential areas—now account for 80.7 percent of the U.S. population, up from 79.0 percent in 2000”).
In 1790, the figure was 5.1 percent, although there have been some intervening changes in the Census
Bureau’s definition of “urban.” See Population: 1790 to 1990: United States, Urban and Rural, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-4.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2014); see
also
History:
Urban
and
Rural
Areas,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/history/www/programs/geography/urban_and_rural_areas.html (last visited Sept. 9,
2014) (detailing definitional changes).
3. See infra Part I.A.1.
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benefits within cities.4 It is not simply a case of “the more the merrier”;5
each additional participant can add value only by burning up scarce
inputs—including space. Brilliant thoughts that might be added together
without apparent limit suddenly run into hard constraints when they must
be delivered in human form, given all that is necessary to house and
propel and sustain human beings as they interact. Likewise, the
complementarities offered by agglomerations of shops, entertainment
establishments, and restaurants are limited by the physical space that
each consumes—space that can be managed and shrunk with clever
layout and transportation solutions,6 but that nonetheless pushes back
hard against the advantages of adding more energy and variety to a
district.7 Meanwhile, heterogeneous households and businesses
asymmetrically generate and absorb the negative and positive
externalities that are interwoven through urban life.8
Urban interaction space can be conceptualized as a type of
commons.9 It presents the threat of overcrowding or overharvesting, but
4. The negative aspects of agglomeration are sometimes referred to in the literature as
“agglomeration diseconomies,” although I will primarily use the word “congestion” very broadly to refer to
these negative effects. See infra Part I.A.2; see also David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic
Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1528–29 (2010) (noting the “catch-all” way in which the term
“congestion” is used and suggesting the term “negative agglomerations”).
5. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 768 (1986) (explaining that increasing returns to scale can
produce what amounts to “the reverse of the ‘tragedy of the commons’: it is a ‘comedy of the commons,’ as
is so felicitously expressed in the phrase, ‘the more the merrier’”).
6. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive
Externalities, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 251–52 (2012) (discussing “vertical malls” like Water Tower
Place in Chicago).
7. I will use the term “energy” throughout the piece in a nontechnical way to refer to the vibrancy
or vitality of an area, which produce its agglomeration benefits. Earlier work has used similar terms to get
at this idea. See, e.g., Casey Dougal et al., Urban Vibrancy and Corporate Growth 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 20350, 2014), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w20350 (using the
term “vibrancy” to capture “the endogenous interactions of the people living in the city . . . that influence
knowledge diffusion between a city’s workers, technology spillovers between neighboring firms, or
consumption externalities between its residents”).
8. See infra Part II (discussing heterogeneity).
9. That urban areas embody and embed common-pool resources is well recognized. For example,
some recent work has focused on how to manage access to congestible or degradable resources such as
urban public parks or shared spatial elements. See, e.g., Sheila R. Foster, Collective Action and the Urban
Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57 (2011); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Managing the Urban Commons, 160
U. PA. L. REV. 1995 (2012); see also Benjamin Davy, Polyrational Property: Rules for the Many Uses of
Land, 8 INT’L J. COMMONS 472, 475 (2014) (addressing the “spatial commons,” defined as “the shared land
uses typical of cities and other human settlements”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics,
10 J. LAND USE AND ENVIRON. L. 45, 68-69 (1994) (discussing the “neighborhood commons”). Other
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it also poses the risk of undercultivation if it fails to attract parties who
are well suited to generate agglomeration benefits.10 The method for
rationing access to prime urban space should, therefore, select not only
for the value that users place on locating in particular spots, but also for
those users’ agglomeration-friendly and congestion-mitigating traits.
What is being rationed is not just access to the consumption
opportunities that particular urban districts offer, but also access to a
(rivalrous) production platform for generating the very agglomeration
economies that make those consumption opportunities so valuable. The
challenge is to assemble participants together whose joint consumption
and production activities will maximize social value.
Cities thus embed a particularly interesting type of collective action
problem, which I will refer to here as a “participant assembly problem.”
Economists have studied many similarly structured problems. Some
notable examples include concert and event ticket pricing that is
designed to attract enthusiastic audiences,11 shopping mall leasing
practices that account for asymmetric spillovers between anchor and
smaller stores,12 local government services like schooling and safety for
which residents represent an important input,13 and differential pricing in
higher education to assemble a desired mix of students.14 In these cases
and more, the characteristics of users or customers are inputs into the
quality of a good,15 complicating the problem of rationing access through
scholars have turned a spotlight on infrastructure elements like roads and mass transit that are interlaced
through private holdings but that themselves elude private ownership. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Commons
and Growth: The Essential Role of Open Commons in Market Economies, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499 (2013)
(reviewing BRETT FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES (2012)).
My discussion focuses primarily on distortions in location choices, a topic distinct from these other
inquiries, but one which carries implications for them (and vice versa).
10. See Rose, supra note 5, at 769 (noting that in contexts like festivals “participants need
encouragement to join these activities, where their participation produces beneficial ‘externalities’ for other
participants”).
11. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
12. These leasing practices have been expressly invoked as a potential model for addressing urban
spillovers. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 6; B. Peter Pashigian & Eric D. Gould,
Internalizing Externalities: The Pricing of Space in Shopping Malls, 41 J.L. & ECON. 115, 140–41 (1998).
13. See, e.g., Robert M. Schwab & Wallace E. Oates, Community Composition and the Provision
of Local Public Goods: A Normative Analysis, 44 J. PUB. ECON. 217 (1991); Wallace E. Oates, The Use of
Local Zoning Ordinances to Regulate Population Flows and the Quality of Local Services, in ESSAYS IN
LABOR MARKET ANALYSIS 201 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1977).
14. See, e.g., Michael Rothschild & Lawrence J. White, The Analytics of the Pricing of Higher
Education and Other Services in Which the Customers Are Inputs, 103 J. POL. ECON. 573 (1995).
15. See, e.g., id.
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ordinary market (or market-mimicking) measures. Despite some worthy
recent attempts to grapple with the issue of optimizing agglomeration
spillovers in cities,16 the legal literature lacks a solid account of the
participant assembly problems that emerge within urban areas and how
they might be resolved. In this essay, I make a start at exploring that
issue.17
The analysis proceeds in three Parts. Part I specifies the nature of the
commons problem that agglomeration and its evil twin, congestion,
together present within urban areas. Part II focuses on the significance of
heterogeneity among economic actors and recasts the challenge as one of
participant assembly. Part III surveys a set of strategies that have been
pursued or might be pursued to grapple with these problems. The
emerging significance of urban agglomeration requires the law to think
flexibly and creatively about the problem of co-location in its assignment
and refinement of property rights.
I. URBAN INTERACTION SPACE AS A COMMONS
A city is not a single common-pool resource, but rather comprises
multiple overlapping resources that interact with private holdings and
that residents, visitors, firms, commuters, tourists, and others access,
exploit, produce, and regenerate in varying combinations. This Part
focuses on one set of decisions that profoundly influences the dynamics
of these multiple commons: the location choices of firms and
households.18 When economic actors—firms and households—occupy
private property in urban areas, the locations they choose serve as
platforms for accessing (and controlling access to) a composite urban
16. See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 637 (2012).

17. Agglomeration benefits come in many forms and exist at a variety of scales, from blocklevel to regional. See, e.g., id. at 638; Pierre-Phillippe Combes & Laurent Gobillon, The Empirics of
Agglomeration Economics in 5 Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics 46-47 (Gilles
Duranton et al., eds, forthcoming 2015) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2505370; see also infra
Part I.A.1. I focus primarily here on relatively small-scale urban settings—prime urban districts—
where space is constrained even if the metropolitan area or the city itself can expand outward.
Accordingly, my analysis does not address factors that bear on the overall growth paths of cities,
such as mountains or bodies of water that present natural barriers to expansion, although these
features can influence the prevalence of good substitutes for a given urban district.
18. By location choices, I mean decisions to possess and occupy real property in a fixed location on
an ongoing (more than short-term) basis, typically through ownership of a leasehold or fee interest. Shorterterm occupancy of spaces by hotel guests, homeless people, hospital patients, and so on also represent
interesting location choices that bear on the overall urban fabric, but these will be addressed here only
indirectly through the decisions made by the owners and operators of the properties that they inhabit.
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resource that I will term “interaction space.” The amount of value that
urban interaction space can generate depends on who can access it, both
as consumers of the space and as contributors to its quality—whether for
good or ill. Location choices determine access to interaction space but,
due to externalized costs and benefits, do not fully price in the effects of
that access.
Section A examines the externalized costs and benefits that flow
from locating within urban areas—both positive agglomeration benefits
and negative congestion costs. Section B explores the dilemmas these
externalities can produce.
A. Agglomeration and Congestion
The densities and interdependencies that characterize urban life yield
both positive and negative externalities. The former are often associated
with the benefits of agglomeration (agglomeration economies), while the
latter are typically associated with the idea of congestion (agglomeration
diseconomies). The tradeoffs between these two types of impacts have
been the subject of economic treatments of city formation and growth.19
Here, I focus on how these two types of externalities might distort the
location choices of firms and households.
1. Agglomeration
The benefits of agglomeration—the clustering together of firms and
households—have long been recognized,20 but legal scholarship has
recently begun to engage agglomeration economics in a more direct and
sustained way.21 Various enumerations of the benefits flowing from

19. See, e.g., Luís M.A. Bettencourt, The Origins of Scaling in Cities, 340 SCIENCE, June 21, 2013,
at 1438; Jeffrey C. Brinkman, Congestion, Agglomeration, and the Structure of Cities (Fed. Reserve Bank
of Phila., Working Paper No. 13-25, 2013), available at http://philadelphiafed.org/research-anddata/publications/working-papers/2013/wp13-25.pdf.
20. The legal literature has sometimes referred to these benefits by other names or in somewhat
different ways than has the economics literature. For example, Carol Rose examined the benefits of certain
forms of widespread collective participation (such as in markets and dances) through the lens of the
commons. Rose, supra note 5. Her focus on increasing returns to scale and the positive externalities of
participation is very much in line with the notion of agglomeration benefits, though she does not use that
term. See id. at 766–71; see also Schleicher, supra note 4, at 1510 & n.14 (discussing legal literature
addressing agglomeration and related ideas); Benkler, supra note 9, at 1511–18 (discussing Rose’s
contributions and their connections to later work on the public domain and infrastructure commons).
21. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 4, at 1510 & n.14; see generally id.; Parchomovsky &
Siegelman, supra note 6; Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 16.
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clustering have appeared in the literature, many of which use the work of
Alfred Marshall as a starting point22 and emphasize such factors as
knowledge spillovers among firms, labor-market matching, and supply
linkages.23 One influential taxonomy uses the broad categories of
“sharing, matching, and learning mechanisms.”24 Parties in close
proximity with each other are able to share indivisible resources (as well
as risk) and mutually benefit from shared access to urban variety and
diversity.25 Proximity also enables actors to match up with each other in
labor and other markets26 and learn from each other.27 Perhaps the most
intuitive agglomeration benefit is the reduction in transportation costs
produced by proximity. Indeed, Edward Glaeser boils down the benefits
of agglomeration to the single idea of reducing transportation costs—for
“goods, people and ideas.”28
The most economically significant manifestations of these benefits
can shift over time as technology changes.29 But whether the advantages
22. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS IV.X.7–13 §3 (8th ed. 1920), available at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Marshall/marP.html.
23. See Gilles Duranton & Diego Puga, Micro-Foundations of Urban Agglomeration Economies, in
4 HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 2063, 2066 (2004); see also J. Vernon Henderson,
Urban Scale Economies, in HANDBOOK OF URBAN STUDIES 243, 243–48 (Ronan Paddison ed., 2001)
(identifying Marshall’s work with the categories of “[i]nformation spillovers,” “[l]abour market
externalities,” and “[u]rban diversity and Adam Smith specialization”); Schleicher, supra note 4, at 1516
(identifying Marshall’s work with “three effects”: “reduced transportation costs for goods,” “insurance and
specialization gains from large labor and consumption markets,” and “information spillovers.”).

24. Duranton & Puga, supra note 23, at 2066 (emphasis omitted); see Combes & Gobillon,
supra note 17, at 2 (citing Duranton and Puga’s schema as “the currently most used typology”).
25. See Duranton & Puga, supra note 23 at 2067-86 (analyzing sharing mechanisms).
26. See id. at 2086-98 (analyzing matching mechanisms). Although studies of agglomeration
economies often focus on labor market matching, urban areas also facilitate the matching of people
into relationships, social organizations, and so on. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 4, at 1521-23.
The specialization and diversity in an urban area, including its shopping and entertainment districts,
also match customers more quickly and precisely with the goods and services they prefer. See id. at
1522.
27. See Duranton & Puga, supra note 23, at 2098-2109 (analyzing learning mechanisms).
28. EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES, AGGLOMERATION, AND SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM 6–8, 117 (2008).
29. For example, some scholars have suggested that cities have become less important as sites of
production as the spatial constraints on production have loosened, and that their importance now turns on
their role as sites of consumption. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Jed Kolko & Albert Saiz, Consumers and
Cities, in THE CITY AS AN ENTERTAINMENT MACHINE 135 (Terry Nichols Clark ed., 2011). On this account,
the ability for cities to conveniently provide a wide array of niche goods and (especially) nonportable
services and experiences becomes relatively more important than the ability of the city to economize on
trips to and from the workplace. See id. at 136 (observing that “restaurants, theaters, and an attractive mix
of social partners are hard to transport and are therefore local goods”); see also MARSHALL, supra note 22,
at IV.X.14 § 4 (observing that reductions in transportation costs enable firms to buy distant goods but also
“tend[] to bring skilled artisans to ply their crafts near to the consumers who will purchase their wares”);
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take the form of deep labor markets, long-tailed retail diversification,
convenient shopping districts, exciting nightlife, opportunities for
relationship matching, or specialized knowledge basins, real economic
value is produced by the co-location of people and firms within urban
areas. The magnitude and nature of these gains will be sensitive to the
relative spatial placement of households, firms, and various land uses
within the urban envelope. Not all landowners are capable of producing
the level of agglomeration benefits that is optimal for a given location.
Hence, it is not only necessary for landowners to “do the right thing” in a
given space, but also for them to “occupy the right spaces”—and stay
away from spaces where their contributions will be suboptimal.30
2. Congestion
Congestion is the flip side of agglomeration. Its existence illuminates
the type of good agglomeration benefits really are. As a first cut, we
might say that congestion keeps agglomeration from being a pure public
good—a resource that is both nonexcludable and nonrival.31 Rather,
congestion makes agglomeration benefits rivalrous or “subtractable,”
even as exclusion from those benefits remains difficult—in other words,
a common-pool resource.32 Like Hardin’s prototypical pasture, urban
space is “open to all” and subject to overgrazing.33 But that is not the full
story. Agglomeration benefits are not depleted by individuals literally
consuming or degrading them in the manner of a cow eating and
trampling grass. Rather, the depletion occurs in two other ways.
The first involves people jostling for a good position in the urban
interaction space. To receive agglomeration benefits, one must occupy a
Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 6, at 242 (focusing on the transportation cost savings that become
available when shoppers are able to bundle their shopping trips for multiple items).
30. It is well recognized that land use conflicts are sometimes best solved by one party—and not
necessarily the one engaging in the more intensive use—staying away. See, e.g., Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co.
v Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1181 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (“Brutal though it may seem to say
it, the inappropriate use to which land is being put in the Blue Island yard and neighborhood may be, not
the transportation of hazardous chemicals, but residential living. The analogy is to building your home
between the runways at O’Hare.”). It can also be inefficient for parties to co-locate even when their land
uses are perfectly compatible, if the co-location forecloses a different co-location that would yield greater
benefits.
31. See, e.g., RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 6–7 (1986).
32. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 23–24 & fig.1.3
(2005).
33. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
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location that affords acccess to them. This interaction space is degraded
when too many people try to occupy it at once, even if the agglomeration
benefits themselves are unaffected.34 Think of a free open-air concert. If
too many people crowd near the stage, the listening and viewing zone
may become unpleasantly crowded. The music itself is unaffected, but
getting into a position to consume this nonrival good requires occupying
physical space, which is rival. Agglomeration benefits, then, might be
viewed as nonrival goods that are strictly complementary to the rival
common-pool resource of well-positioned space.
Second, congestion elicits responses that can impede the production
of agglomeration benefits. Before purely physical or engineering
capacity constraints are reached, the negative effects of congestion will
typically prompt collective action that rations access to the interaction
space, turning it into at least a partially excludable resource.35 But unless
the method of rationing access is well calibrated to allow in the right
number and type of participants, agglomeration economies may suffer.
For example, a predominance of large-lot zoning can limit the number of
people who can enter a municipality for purposes of consuming its goods
and services, but it also limits the number of people who will be on hand
to add to the life of the community.
Heterogeneity among potential participants creates additional
difficulties. When space is tightly limited, every inclusion implies an
exclusion—one that will impact both the consumption and production
sides of the urban agglomeration equation. Ideally, prime urban space for
generating agglomeration benefits would be matched to its most valuable
use, taking into account the congestion impacts inflicted and suffered by
that use. The fact that not all of the effects of locational choices are
internalized to the chooser, however, presents an interesting collective
action problem.

34. In the urban context, an interaction space represents a congestible resource-appropriation
environment within which nonrival agglomeration benefits can be enjoyed. Cf. Lee Anne Fennell,
Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 922–24 (2004) (noting that although a “fixed-pot”
resource is not diminished by commoners competing over it, there can still be losses in the linked
“resource-appropriation environment”).
35. If the excludability is complete enough, the agglomeration benefits may resemble a club good.
For description and analysis of club goods, see James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32
ECONOMICA 125 (1965). See also OSTROM, supra note 32, at 23-24 fig. 1.3 (using the term “toll goods” for
resources combining relatively easy exclusion with low subtractability).
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B. Locating Dilemmas
To understand the nature of the dilemma produced by location
decisions, we can start by examining where and how private payoffs and
social payoffs diverge.
1. Mixed ownership and incentive misalignments
Tragedies of the commons come in two basic flavors: overuse (e.g.,
overgrazing a pasture) and underinvestment (e.g., shirking on a
communal farm).36 Both problems arise from a misalignment between
privately owned elements (cows and labor) and commonly owned
elements (pastures and crops).37 People make decisions that
simultaneously affect both the commonly owned and individually owned
elements, but because they experience all of the payoffs associated with
the private holdings and only a fraction of the payoffs of the common
holdings, these decisions may be skewed. The resulting incentive
misalignment can be readily modeled as a two-person Prisoner’s
Dilemma in which each party has an incentive to defect (add too many
cattle, for example), regardless of what the other person does.38 This
tragic result is far from inevitable for a number of reasons that have been
well rehearsed in the literature.39 Nonetheless, the standard fable
provides a conceptual starting point for thinking about how private and
social payoffs pull apart.
The city analog to placing an additional cow on the commons is the
decision to locate one’s firm or household, along with the privately
owned structure that contains it, in a particular position within an urban

36. Nothing turns on this distinction, however, and it is often possible to characterize a given
situation in both ways. See Fennell, supra note 34, at 917 (observing that a dirty carpet in the common
room of a house could be characterized either as stemming from overuse of the carpet while wearing
muddy shoes or underinvestment in shoe-cleaning or carpet-cleaning efforts).
37. See, e.g., id. at 916; Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J.
ECON. HIST. 16, 22–23 (1973) (noting problematic potential of “incongruity between ownership
opportunities”); Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 35, 37–38 n.16 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011)
(discussing tragedy as a function of an abutment between private and common ownership elements, and
citing related literature).
38. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 3–5 (1990).
39. See id. at 58-102 (describing self-governed common-pool resources that have endured for long
periods of time); see also Fennell, supra note 37, at 35–36 (discussing literature).
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area.40 Such structures and their operations, like grazing cattle, draw
sustenance from, and visit impacts upon, the surrounding community.
Does the city then become “overgrazed”? Not necessarily. As Carol Rose
explained in The Comedy of the Commons, there are aspects of city
life—marketplaces, communication, celebration—that gain energy and
value from an abundance of participants.41 Instead of resembling cattle
that only degrade the commons with their trampling and grazing,
economic actors who locate themselves within a city operate more like
an especially talented variety of cattle who, by virtue of their proximity
to each other, can cause manna to rain down from heaven for everyone—
even as they also trample and graze.
Thus, some of the returns from urban locational decisions are
privately captured by the locating actors and some are diffused through
the community through parallels to manna (agglomeration benefits) and
trampling (congestion costs).42 The relationship among these payoff
streams bears on firm and household decisions about where to locate—
and determines whether and how those decisions will be distorted.
2. Privately captured returns: Of buckets and spoons
First, consider a firm’s or household’s privately captured returns.
These returns can stem either from the owner’s activities on her property
or from her choice of location, which exposes her to negative and
positive spillovers from outside her property. I have previously
characterized property as a “leaky bucket of gambles” that aims, albeit
imperfectly, to collect inputs made by the owner and deliver back to her
the associated outcomes.43 In an agrarian context, the relationship is
captured by the idea of reaping what one sows, where enforceable
property boundaries do a reasonable job of containing both inputs and
outcomes. As we move to metropolitan settings, however, an increasingly
40. It might seem that one is not making any decision at all about the placement of the structure
one occupies if one moves into an existing building. However, by occupying the structure for one’s
intended purpose, it is as if one is effectively continuing to locate the structure there over time insofar as
one’s own occupancy stands as an impediment to the repurposing, demolition, or rearrangement of the
structure in question.
41. Rose, supra note 5; see also supra Part I.A.1 (discussing agglomeration benefits).
42. Although I use the term “congestion costs” as a shorthand, not all costs associated with
locational choices take the form of physical crowdedness. Pockets of low-density space that must be
traversed in order for parties to interact and secure agglomeration benefits also serve to “congest” the
relevant urban landscape, even though they may make the area feel less rather than more crowded.
43. Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1405, 1442–43 (2007).
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large proportion of the value associated with property has nothing to do
with what the owner is doing on or with the property; rather, it depends
on where the property is located relative to other users and uses (as
mediated by land use controls and augmented by governmental provision
of infrastructure and public goods).44 Thus, the outcomes of the gambles
any given owner takes with respect to her property are increasingly in the
hands of other parties.
Private property continues to serve as a locus for making and
collecting on investments that are made on-site, but many of the privately
captured payoffs it generates stem from its location rather than from any
behavior on the part of the owner. Real property, by virtue of the spatial
position it occupies relative to other uses and users, serves as a kind of
spoon for collecting the positive benefits of agglomeration. The value of
what is scooped up depends not just on who is co-located nearby, but
also on how the owner’s uses interact with those co-located uses.
However, just as only so many spoons can be inserted into a communal
bowl of ice cream before the dessert-eating experience starts to
degrade,45 the agglomeration-scooping capacity of property is rival and
subject to congestion. Each economic actor that locates in a given
interaction space depletes the physical area available to others who might
similarly wish to enjoy agglomeration benefits.
Of course, as the reference to congestion suggests, part of what the
property scoops up comprises negative rather than positive effects of
proximity to other uses and users. Where these negative elements
dominate, the property’s location may be more like a sponge that
passively picks up externalities than a spoon that actively seeks to
capture them. Every economic actor would prefer that others absorb the
negative impacts of neighboring uses, but wishes to be located in such a
manner as to benefit from the positive impacts.
3. Dispersed impacts: Sloshes and sparks
Consider next the impacts that are not captured by a given owner, but
that are instead diffused to others in the area, becoming part of the
locational payoffs that nearby others enjoy (or suffer). Some of these
44. By the same token, her activities as an owner are likely to have increasingly significant crossboundary impacts on those around her, for better or worse.
45. See Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common
Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 6 (using an ice cream cone as example of individual resource, whereas “a
milkshake might allow two consumers, if they are friendly”).
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dispersed impacts are literal spillovers from specific behaviors that
owners engage in on their properties. A factory that makes widgets or
chocolate will have impacts, negative or positive, on multiple neighbors
by virtue of dust or odors put into the air that flow over the property
lines. These are “sloshes” (even if microscopic or aesthetic) from the
owner’s bucket of gambles. Spillovers of this nature are discouraged by
the law; one can be made to pay for harms affecting one’s neighbors, but
one cannot generally collect payment for benefits conferred on them. 46
This asymmetry exists for good reason: it creates incentives for
economic actors to keep the impacts of their operations within their own
boundaries and to avoid substituting forced transactions for consensual
ones.47
Other impacts flow cumulatively or synergistically from the
combined interactions of businesses, enterprises, and households. For
example, each proximate commercial shop contributes to a “shopping
district” and each art gallery contributes to the “gallery district” simply
by virtue of its existence and possession of certain functional and
qualitative attributes. Similarly, a “tech corridor” or “eclectic
neighborhood” depends in significant part on the cumulative
characteristics of the enterprises and residents, respectively. Impacts in
this category are not unintended sloshes from a discrete on-site enterprise
but rather are “sparks” that can come together to produce local public
goods (or bads), depending on who and what else is in the vicinity. If
there is nothing nearby to “catch fire,” the impact is never experienced.48
46. See, e.g., Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits,
108 MICH. L. REV. 189, 195–98 (2009); Scott Hershovitz, Two Models of Tort (and Takings), 92 VA. L.
REV. 1147, 1157–59 (2006); Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65 (1985). Where one
cannot collect for positive externalities conferred on others, one has less incentive to engage in the activity
that generates those spillovers. This does not mean, however, that parties will always refrain from activities
that generate positive benefits for others; they would be expected to engage in them if their internalized
returns are high enough to justify the activity. In such cases, the positive externalities are Pareto-irrelevant
ones. See text accompanying notes 54–58, infra.
47. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 43, at 1450–52; Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Negative Liability, 38 J.
LEGAL STUD. 21, 25 (2009) (“[A]llowing a party to collect for benefits voluntarily conferred would
encourage, rather than discourage, the voluntarily bypassing of the market.”). For other potential
explanations of the limits on restitution, including the law’s attempt to identify the “better bargainer,” see
Levmore, supra note 46, at 68–81.
48. This is of course true of traditional nuisance-like spillovers as well, as Coase famously
observed in pointing out the reciprocal nature of land use incompatibilities. See R.H. Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J. L. ECON. 1, 2 (1960). The insight is captured well in the maxim “it takes two to tort.”
See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 771, 822
(1982).
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Where the effects are positive, there is a social interest in promoting the
mix of conditions and participants that foster them.
As with actual sparks that can contribute to destructive fires or
productive combustion, mixing activity within an interaction space can
produce negative as well as positive synergies. Under the general rubric
of congestion we can place a variety of negatives, from crime and
juvenile delinquency, to low-level increases in incivility and jostling, to
issues like pollution and traffic snarls. While some of these effects may
be easy to connect to particular land uses (and therefore are more sloshlike), many arise through cumulative and often nonlinear effects among
many uses in an urban area.
The interactions between internalized and externalized payoffs create
potential distortions in behavior, including the initial decision about
where to locate. Every household or firm will wish to position itself to
maximize the net positive inputs into its own private income and
consumption stream that it can derive from the commonly owned
elements that surround it.49 At the same time, each household or firm will
be largely indifferent to the magnitude or sign of its own contributions to
the collective. The next section considers whether and how these
incentive misalignments are likely to matter.
C. Plentitude and Irrelevance
In the city, the tragedy of the commons and the comedy of the
commons come together—at least potentially. Locating in the city may
mean imposing costs on others, but staying out of the city may deprive
others of the benefits of interaction. Which story will be the dominant
one depends on what is plentiful and what is in short supply. If
interaction space is plentiful, the need for interacting parties (and the
associated “energy” or vibrancy) becomes the focus. If interacting
parties are plentiful relative to the available interaction space, however,
then congestion becomes salient and the situation takes on the cast of an
overgrazing tragedy. The two scenarios both carry the potential for
tragedy: one through underprovision of an energy-producing input
(human capital) and the other through overgrazing of another input

49. For a helpful recent discussion of the ubiquity of commonly owned elements interwoven
through private property arrangements, see generally Benkler, supra note 9. In addition to infrastructure,
however, the agglomeration economies that are produced and the overall atmosphere that produces it are
part of the urban commons.
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essential to the production of a city’s energy (space). Because both inputs
are necessary to the alchemy that takes place within a city, the
undersupply of one and the overdrawing of the other are both
problematic.
These two problems could conceivably appear together (an
uncomfortably crowded city that is nonetheless bereft of any useful
activity). But often the pressure of one of these problems causes the other
to fade out of view, at least temporarily. Consider a shrinking city that is
losing population and investment. Underprovision of the kind of dynamic
agglomerations that spark growth is the pressing problem. Interaction
space, while strictly necessary to carry out any plan of revitalization,
may not be in any immediate danger of being overgrazed. It is, for the
moment at least, a plenteous good.50 The fact that space may be
consumed by economic actors without regard for the effects on others is
of no consequence because it is not currently scarce. But, importantly, its
plentitude is an artifact of the tragedy of underprovision that is taking
center stage. Conversely, once congestion becomes a concern, the
overuse of space (and related resources) may become the focal point,
while the need to induce optimal human capital contributions takes a
back seat. Overcorrections may undo not just the congestion but the
underlying (positive) cause of it.51
At other times, both inputs—space and human capital—may be
sufficiently plenteous in supply as to present a “comic” scenario in which
the commons is less a site of strife than a platform that enables actors to
freely enjoy and produce reciprocal spillovers that generate increasing
returns to scale—”the more the merrier.”52 Even within the comic
narrative, there may be some need to encourage participation.53 However,
positive externalities of the sort historically generated through
participation in markets, festivals, and other interactive arenas may have
required little encouragement. Each actor reciprocally gleaned roughly as
much from others as she contributed to others through her

50. See Rose, supra note 5, at 717–18 (discussing plenteous goods).
51. The result may resemble a Yogi Berra quip: “No one goes there anymore; it’s too crowded.”
For an analysis of Berra’s comment in the context of overcrowded taverns, see Matthew Yglesias, The
Economics of Nobody Goes There Anymore, It’s Too Crowded, SLATE (Aug. 8, 2012)
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2012/08/08/the_economics_of_nobody_
goes_there_anymore_it_s_too_crowded.html.
52. Rose, supra note 5, at 768.
53. Id. at 769.
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participation—and, importantly, was typically contributing and gleaning
through the very same discrete action in the commons, so that gleaning
could not be unbundled from contributing.
These points connect tightly to an important distinction between
Pareto-relevant and Pareto-irrelevant externalities, which James
Buchanan and William Stubblebine explored in a groundbreaking (but
still insufficiently appreciated) article.54 An externality that is irrelevant
to Pareto-efficiency is one whose continued existence (that is, the fact
that the costs or benefits in question have not been internalized to the
actor who produces it) does not alter the behavior of the actor. A factory
that pollutes heedless of its neighbors, but that would go on polluting at
the same level even if it were forced to pay for the harm to its neighbors,
is producing an irrelevant negative externality. Likewise, a gardener who
makes her garden as beautiful for her own pleasure as she would make it
if her neighbors were forced to pay for all the spillover benefits they
receive is producing an irrelevant positive externality.
External effects are often irrelevant to efficiency because the actor
would behave no differently if she were to internalize those effects. In
the case of a negative externality like crowding, perhaps she would still
glean enough from being present in a given location to make it worth her
while even if she had to pay full freight for the costs her presence
imposes on others. In the case of a positive externality like contributions
to a city’s overall vitality, it may again be the case that the actor would
behave no differently even if those effects were internalized because her
private payoff schedule aligns sufficiently with the social optimum. A
comedy of the commons story does not mean that externalities are
absent, but rather that they are (at least largely) irrelevant to efficiency.55
The fact that externalities are irrelevant to efficiency in one time and
place does not mean they will remain so forever.56 Resources such as
urban parks that appear nonrival (plenteous) at one level of use can
become rival (congestible) above that level.57 Likewise, contributions to
54. James M. Buchanan & W. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA, 371 (1962).
55. Public subsidies in the form of infrastructure or guaranteed access may have worked very well
historically in bringing participants to the point where self-interest would justify actions with positive
spillovers. See Rose, supra note 5, at 770 (discussing how public choices about roads and waterways
encouraged commerce).
56. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (Papers and
Proceedings) 347 (1967) (observing that changes in the value of resources can cause property rights to
emerge, where it becomes worthwhile to bear the costs of defining and enforcing them).
57. See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
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a common enterprise that flow freely under one set of circumstances can
dry up without much warning.58 Urbanization may well have turned
positive interactions that were mostly self-perpetuating affairs in the past
into far more economically significant, heterogeneous, and fragile
phenomena, while bringing the problems of congestion to the forefront.
II. HETEROGENEITY IN THE COMMONS
The prototypical commons tragedy assumes homogeneity among the
players: all cattle are standard issue and deliver equal benefits to their
owners and visit equal harms upon the commons. In an urban context, we
must contend not only with a mix of positive and negative externalities
but also with great heterogeneity among actors in their ability to
generate, magnify, absorb, and deflect these impacts. Because
participants in a commons are both producers and consumers, the
characteristics and behaviors of the participants influence the nature of
their joint product.59 Product degradation can occur not just through
outright crowding, but also as a result of the opportunity costs of having
suboptimal contributors in place, whether they are actually putting bads
into the commons or simply failing to contribute as much as another
participant would.60
Section A offers a stylized look at heterogeneity by considering the
significance of variation along two dimensions: capacity to generate
urban vitality or “energy” and contributions to congestion or “clog.”
Section B explains why existing market structures and self-selection do
not resolve the participant assembly problem that urban interaction space
presents. Section C notes the complications that arise when location
decisions have impacts at multiple scales (e.g., both within and between

57, 59 (2011) (explaining that overuse can turn an initially nonrival resource like a park into a rivalrous
one); Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources,
1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 6–7 (1991) (describing the congestion point for goods that are plenteous up to a certain
consumption level but congestible above that level).
58. See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 91–92 (1978)
(describing how the dynamics of interdependent choice can unravel collective projects, and giving the
example of a “dying seminar”).
59. See text accompanying notes 11–15; see also Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit and Voice: User
Participation in the Production of Local Public Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2001).
60. See, e.g., Ronit Levine-Schnur, Agreements Between Local Governments and Private
Entrepreneurs as a Means for Urban Development 43–54, 157–66 (August 2014) (unpublished dissertation
on file with author) (discussing differential contributions to and draws from urban surpluses made by
different actors and the possibility of taking these into account in bargains over development rights).
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municipalities).
A. Energy Versus Clog
Both agglomeration benefits (“energy”) and congestion costs
(“clog”) rise as additional economic actors are added to an urban area.
But these benefits and costs do not rise at the same rate. Agglomeration
produces increasing returns to scale, at least within a certain range. At
some point, however, the increasing marginal costs of congestion catch
up with agglomeration benefits. If all economic actors were equivalent
and fungible, we would simply add more actors to an area until the
marginal congestion costs thereby generated were just equal to the
marginal agglomeration benefits produced. But because economic actors
are not fungible, the particular combination of actors determines how
many is too many. The optimizing mix of actors will also vary over time
due to the availability of co-locators and the surrounding social and
economic conditions.
Introducing heterogeneity among actors along just two dimensions
reveals important aspects of the problem. Suppose there are four types of
economic actors (either firms or households) who might locate within a
given urban area, classifiable based on their ability and propensity to
contribute to agglomeration economies (energy) and congestion costs
(clog).
Table 1:
Heterogeneous Actors
Low Clog
High Energy
Buzz Builders
Low Energy
Lackluster Lites

High Clog
Massive Movers
Space-Eating Slugs

Energy, as used here, stands in for a wide range of synergies and
agglomeration economies associated with proximity. Clog represents a
constraint on the ability to use proximity to generate and consume
energy. Obvious clogs include dead space that must be traversed,
uncomfortably crowded conditions, and other hassles that must be
endured to partake of the energy within an urban space.
As shown in Table 1, the intersection of these two characteristics
give us two extremes: desirable “buzz builders” who contribute a great
deal to the city’s energy while generating very little clog and “spaceeating slugs” who contribute a great deal to clog and very little to urban
energy. An example of the former might be an exciting new high tech
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firm that employs many creative workers but does not demand a large
physical plant, while an example of the latter might be a large surface
parking lot that is mostly underutilized. Table 1 also includes two
intermediate cases: “lackluster lites,” who have little impact on a city’s
energy or its congestion (here, consider apartment residents who rarely
leave the building), and “massive movers,” who have large impacts on
both (think big box stores, amusement parks, stadiums, and large
industrial plants).61
Private decisions about location (as shaped by public policy and land
use regulations) can make the difference between a lively urban area
filled with buzz builders and a domain of space-eating slugs. Increasing
one’s energy quotient and reducing one’s contributions to clog are both
costly. More fundamentally, not all actors are equally equipped to play
each of the roles in Table 1. Indeed, it may be impossible for some
households or firms to reduce their clog footprint or increase their energy
quotient. But as long as the private payoff remains attractive, such actors
will continue to locate in places that could generate more value if
occupied by an actor with a different energy-to-clog ratio.
There is a great deal that Table 1’s simplification leaves out. Perhaps
most significantly, the ability of an economic actor to contribute to
energy or to produce clog is not an immutable fact but rather depends on
what other actors and uses are nearby. Nonetheless, even the highly
stylized presentation of heterogeneity developed here will help to
illustrate why existing markets for urban interaction space are
incomplete.
B. Assembly Failures
We might initially wonder why we cannot rely on markets to
assemble urban participants optimally, just as we usually rely on markets
to channel other goods and services to their highest valuers.62 For now,
let us assume that actors are making location decisions independently,
without any formal or informal mechanisms for coordinating their
61. Within the microcosm of a shopping mall, anchor stores would be the “massive movers.” See
Eric D. Gould et al., Contracts, Externalities, and Incentives in Shopping Malls, 87 REV. ECON. & STAT.
411, 411 (2005) (explaining that in a typical mall, anchor stores “are responsible for attracting most of the
consumer traffic to the mall” and “[o]n average, . . . occupy over 58% of the total leasable space in the
mall”).

62. The idea of a “location market” was helpfully explored in Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra
note 16.
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choices.63 If there were no interaction effects among co-locating firms
and households, these independent decisions would work well: The
person who paid the most for a given parcel would be the one who
enjoyed its attributes the most or had the skills to derive the most profit
from those attributes. Thus, a parcel containing an isolated cabin and a
grove of trees would be purchased by the person who enjoyed viewing
the trees the most, liked the cabin’s design the most, or could most
profitably turn trees into products like fence posts and tables.
However, the primary defining attribute of any parcel is its location
relative to other land uses and land users, not just the objects or amenities
that the parcel itself contains or provides. In the urban context, this factor
takes on overwhelming significance.64 We might expect the benefits and
detriments of proximity to co-locators to get capitalized into the value of
the property and become part of the package that parties bid against each
other to acquire.65 Uncertainty about the magnitude and valence of those
impacts might be an issue, but land use controls can help to stabilize
expectations,66 even if they do so imperfectly.67
Expected impacts do more than influence property values; they also
generate selection effects. Thus, other things equal, we might expect
urban areas to be populated by economic actors who are most resilient to
negative externalities in the area and most benefited by positive
externalities. For example, households without children who are not as
concerned about low-level criminality and who especially enjoy

63. Of course, a number of potential coordination mechanisms do exist, some of which will
be addressed below. See Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 16, at 658-62; infra Part III.
64. Indeed, at a broad level, the overwhelming significance of this factor is an important
explanation for urbanization itself. See, e.g., GLAESER, supra note 28, at 5 (“Agglomeration economies are
the catchall explanation for why cities can be so productive and why so many people flock to urban
areas.”).
65. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 6–7 (2001) (discussing
capitalization of local amenities and services into home prices).
66. See, e.g., LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME 39–44 (2009) (discussing land use
controls as “product stabilizers”); Michelle J. White & Donald Wittman, Optimal Spatial Location Under
Pollution: Liability Rules and Zoning, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 266 (1981) (explaining how zoning “shifts
the burden of forecasting future land-use patterns” and thereby “reduces uncertainty”).
67. For one thing, such controls are subject to political change, including piecemeal adjustments
attained through ad hoc bargains. Whether the prevalence of such changes is a feature or a bug is the
subject of debate. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills & David Schleicher, City Replanning, 20–36 (Aug. 9, 2014)
(manuscript) (George Mason Univ. Law and Econ. Research Paper Series 14-32), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2477125 (discussing and challenging favorable views of piecemeal, ad hoc
bargaining over land use regulation).
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proximity to restaurants and nightclubs will be willing to outbid
households who feel the negative effects of urbanity more sharply and
who are relatively less appreciative of its charms. Likewise, firms that
can benefit from knowledge spillovers or foot traffic associated with
neighboring firms will have more to gain from locating near others, and
those whose customers do not mind crowds and difficult parking will
have less to lose from congestion. All of these preferences will be
reflected in the amounts that parties are willing to pay for the location.
Yet we cannot fully rely on markets and sorting to generate optimal
agglomerations.68 This is so even if we set aside potential distortions
arising from land use controls.69 The problem is this: the party who is the
high bidder for the location in question will herself generate a stream of
negative and positive externalities by virtue of her location choice. The
cash price that she pays for the location will be either augmented or
degraded by what she does or does not bring to the table in terms of
negative and positive spillovers—that is, whether her specific land use
operates as a buzz builder, a space-eating slug, or something in between.
If cash prices were the sole basis for allocating urban locations, a buzz
builder who would add a large premium in kind to the community could
be outbid by a space-eating slug for a prime spot in urban interaction
space.70
To be sure, such a distortion would not occur if the propensity to add
positive externalities to an area were tightly correlated with one’s own
valuation of that area—if, to use the terminology above, only a buzz
builder could thrive in spots where buzz building would be valuable. In
that case, being the high bidder based on one’s own valuation would
offer a good proxy for being the best contributor to the area. Such
correlations are sometimes quite plausible. For example, it has been
suggested that a high tech firm’s “absorptive capacity”—its ability to
benefit from the research and development (R&D) efforts of other
firms—may depend on its own spillover-producing R&D efforts.71
68. For distinct but related critiques, see id. at 34–36 (suggesting sorting is an incomplete response
to excessive land use regulation); Schleicher, supra note 4 at 1535–45 (noting tension between sorting and
agglomeration).
69. Land use controls structure and limit the “location market,” and there is little reason to expect
that they do so optimally. See generally Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 16.

70. Government policies, including land use controls, also play a major role in regulating
access to urban locations, as do various forms of private action. See generally id; infra Part III.
71. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 269 (2007)
(footnote omitted) (suggesting that “investments in R&D may increase a firm’s capacity to absorb
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Similarly, perhaps households who enjoy crowds and excitement and
therefore seek out urban residential areas are the very same people who
are best positioned to contribute ideas and creativity to the commons. But
the opposite might also be true. For example, a wealthy middle-aged
couple might wish to soak up the hip ambience of a trendy neighborhood
but might do little or nothing to help maintain the neighborhood’s
hipness against the influx of moneyed, unhip people such as themselves.
Meanwhile, other people who would be excellent contributors in terms of
ideas and creativity may flee clogged conditions for ones more
conducive to their particular style of working.
In sum, the characteristics that cause particular economic actors to
derive the most value from a given location may or may not be the same
characteristics that would lead them to contribute the most value to that
location. Here, as in other commons situations, there is a potential
mismatch between the privately owned element (access to a given
location) and the commonly owned one (the overall urban atmosphere).72
The share of the commons that one’s private location affords cannot be
properly priced unless the price accounts for the benefits or detriments
that the locating party will herself be adding or deducting in kind by
virtue of locating there.
While the failure to account for the locator’s own impacts may be the
most fundamental source of market failure, other factors also drive a
wedge between the social payoffs from a given location choice and the
locator’s expected private payoffs. Instead of choosing immobile
attributes (e.g., a cabin and trees) that are confined within a given parcel
of land, an actor who chooses an urban location is choosing a set of
neighbors and prospective neighbors whose identities and activities lie
outside the chooser’s control and cannot be reliably predicted.73
Significantly, she recognizes each new in-mover, like she herself, will
not internalize all the impacts that are generated by the location choice.
spillovers from competitors and/or other industries altogether,” providing “an incentive to develop
‘absorptive capacity’ for inevitable spillovers by investing in R&D”); see also Rodriguez & Schleicher,
supra note 16, at 651 (observing that only select groups are well-positioned to capture certain kinds of
spillovers, and giving the example of a lobbyist who would provide useful spillovers to another lobbyist but
would be “a bore” to most others).
72. See supra Part I.B.1.
73. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Crowdsourcing Land Use, 78 BROOKLYN L. REV. 385, 388–402
(2013) (discussing various “informational shortfalls” about land uses and users, and some ways they might
be mitigated); Thomas C. Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 1 J. MATH. SOC. 143, 145 (1971)
(“To choose a neighborhood is to choose neighbors.”).
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In addition to directly adjacent parcels that may literally produce crossboundary spillovers for a given actor, more distantly located economic
actors will also influence a given locator’s payoffs. Even if expected
values can be calculated, risk-averse actors may underbid for locations
where property values are expected to exhibit high levels of variation.
Future governmental decisions as well as future private decisions can
add uncertainty. The value of land to an economic actor depends
crucially on whether her preferred uses of the land are (or will be) both
(a) legally permitted, and (b) practically possible given the land use
rights given to others. A legal restriction could rule out a preferred use,
but so too could a conflicting nearby use that is (or becomes) legally
permissible. For example, keeping livestock might become
impermissible as a city expands (which could thwart the expectations of
ranchers) or keeping livestock might remain permissible through a “right
to farm” act (which could thwart the expectations of those planning
residential development nearby).74 Government restrictions on land use
can narrow the uncertainty associated with the behavior of private actors,
but they can also introduce new uncertainties associated with the effects
of government action—and inaction.75
Finally, I have assumed to this point that there is an active “bidding”
process that stands ready to move property into the hands of higher
valuers (even if those valuations are distorted in the ways already
suggested). But property rights that are physically rooted and perpetual
in duration can impede the movement of resources into higher valued
uses. Local property owners have a monopoly on their particular parts of
the urban scape—one that may become especially significant where a
shift to a larger scale of use (like a large development project) would add
value.76 The possibility of strategic behavior among potential sellers in
an effort to glean more surplus from an assembly effort presents familiar
holdout problems that can impede movement of property to a more
valuable use.77
74. See, e.g., ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS 547 (4th ed. 2013) (describing right-to-farm
legislation, which protects those with ongoing agricultural operations against nuisance actions under
specified circumstances).
75. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect
Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345 (2014).
76. See, e.g., Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465,
1473 (2008) (observing that land assembly situations turn existing owners into “monopoly suppliers”).
77. This is, of course, a primary justification for eminent domain. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill,
The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986).
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C. Multi-Jurisdictional Locational Choice
Another complication associated with heterogeneity involves the
patterns in which economic actors—households and firms—array
themselves across jurisdictions within a metropolitan area.78 These
choices generate gains and losses for the choosers as well as for society
at large. Because of the ways in which choices combine to generate
negative and positive agglomeration effects, locational choices within
urban areas are a positive-sum game—not a zero-sum proposition in
which each gain to City A is perfectly balanced out by a loss to Suburb
B, and vice versa. This would be true even in the absence of
heterogeneity as long as adding participants to a given subarea produces
nonlinear returns. But heterogeneity makes the problem more
complicated and raises the stakes associated with solving it; it is no
longer a matter of just managing numbers across jurisdictions, but also of
optimizing along other dimensions.
I have written elsewhere about some of the dynamics and
interdependencies that characterize choices among jurisdictions within a
metropolitan area, and I will not revisit those points in detail here.79 But
it is worth emphasizing that there are two sets of opportunity costs
associated with each locational choice. First, each locating firm or
household occupies rival interaction space that keeps some other firm or
household out of that space. Second, each locating firm or household, by
placing its locational investment here and not there, is removing from the
metropolitan pattern the alternative locational investment that it could
have made. Thus, getting economic actors into the places where they can
do the most good means keeping them out places where they will block
better contributors or squander their own contributions.
The problems are too complex to untangle here, but raising the issue
of multiple jurisdictions does suggest two things. First, some degree of
mitigation may be in the picture even when location decisions are

78. Households and firms make choices between metropolitan areas as well. Although I am not
focusing on those choices here, similar dynamics keep intermetropolitan choices from being zero-sum. See,
e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Wrong Way Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/25/opinion/paul-krugman-wrong-way-nation.html
(arguing
that
households relocating to the south and west are doing so because of affordable housing, not because of
better opportunities, and that housing policy should enable them to stay in the northeast and in California
where their productivity would be higher).
79. See FENNELL, supra note 66; Fennell, supra note 59; Lee Anne Fennell, Properties of
Concentration, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227 (2006).
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distorted. Household A is priced out of its most socially valuable spot in
the center city, perhaps, but makes outstanding contributions in the
suburban neighborhood where it eventually locates. Even though there is
a social loss, the loss is not complete because Household A still locates
somewhere in the metro area and is still contributing to the urban
agglomeration, even at a lower level.
Second, as this example suggests, there may be interesting
distributive effects that flow from inefficient location decisions. Thus,
having high-energy households like Household A scattered among the
hinterlands could produce benefits for those who would never be
competitive to locate in the central city in an undistorted market. This is
true even if we posit that the hinterlands gain less from Household A than
the core city would. Maximizing agglomeration benefits across a system
may produce a harmful stratification that is somewhat mitigated by the
location “errors” an imperfect system produces.
In the balance of the piece, I will focus not on the difficult question
of how best to arrange economic units within a metropolitan area, but
rather on how existing tools fail to grapple with smaller-scale
agglomeration economies—and how new tools might do a better job.
Once we know how law and policy can meaningfully alter the
agglomeration landscape, questions about larger-scale agglomeration
patterns can be more usefully addressed.
III. PURSUING PARTICIPANT ASSEMBLY
Urban areas comprise a conjoined set: (1) a congestible resource
(interaction space) that is subject to overharvest, and (2) a strictly
complementary public good (web of agglomeration benefits) that is
subject to underinvestment. Dodging tragedies of overharvesting and
underinvestment depends crucially on the characteristics and capacities
of economic actors who are assembled together in the interaction space,
and not just on their day-to-day behaviors.80 Solving the commons
80. Both location choices and behavioral choices matter to externalities. Cf. Gould et al., supra
note 61, at 419 (explaining that in the shopping mall context, “[e]xternalities are generated not only by the
presence of certain stores, but also by the actions the stores take, such as advertising, maintaining
cleanliness, courtesy, and product variety.”). Both can be affected by land use controls. See, e.g., FENNELL,
supra note 66, at 123–26 (distinguishing “compliance effects” of land use restrictions from “membership
effects” that determine who locates in the community); Michael J. Pogodzinski & Tim R. Sass. The
Economic Theory of Zoning: A Critical Review, 66 LAND ECON. 294, 295 (1990) (distinguishing “direct”
effects of land use controls from those generated by mobility). However, because location decisions are a
necessary predicate to behavioral decisions in the presence of heterogeneity, the former are my primary
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problems playing out within cities, therefore, requires going beyond
mere crowd control or regulation to tackle the intricate task of optimally
assembling participants.
I have already suggested why market-assisted self-selection cannot
achieve optimal participant assembly on its own.81 Section A explains
why existing land use controls are not very good at solving participant
assembly problems as they exist in urban areas. Section B considers a
range of strategies that might be able to better harness urban energy
while controlling clog.
A. Shortfalls in Traditional Land Use Controls
Scholars have recently criticized land use law for focusing almost
exclusively on negative externalities and neglecting positive
externalities.82 This critique requires refinement. In fact, the line between
negative and positive externalities is illusory, since nearly every impact
can be characterized in either way. Pigou’s work offers a classic
example: when discussing smoke pollution, which might seem like an
obvious negative externality,83 Pigou observed how keeping one’s
chimney from emitting smoke conferred a positive externality.84 And
while it is indeed unusual for the law to require those who benefit from a
spillover to fork over payment for it,85 the law very commonly mandates
actions that can be readily understood as requiring parties to reciprocally
confer benefits on each other.86
Consider, for example, zoning provisions that restrict land use in a
given area to residential housing on lots of a certain size or that require

focus here.
81. See supra Part II.B.
82. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 6, at 223–30.
83. See id. at 220–21 (citing Pigou in discussing significance of negative externalities in law and
economics).
84. A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 160–61 (1920) (noting that “resources devoted to
the prevention of smoke from factory chimneys” represent “uncompensated services” while the smoke
itself “inflicts a heavy uncharged loss on the community”); see also Coase, supra note 48, at 35 (1960)
(discussing Pigou’s characterization of those who keep their chimneys from smoking as “render[ing]
services for which they receive no payment”); James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 325 n.3 (1992) (discussing Pigou’s view of pollution control as generating a
positive externality).
85. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
86. For discussion of some other ways that the law addresses positive externalities outside of
restitution, see Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 47, at 49–54.
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setbacks and minimum spacing between buildings. By complying with
these restrictions, each landowner contributes in kind to a collective
result.87 Similarly, design requirements may aim to improve the
appearance of an area, or residential community covenants may require
homeowners to provide (or fund the provision of) lawn care, fence
maintenance, and the like. All of these examples and many more could
be characterized as addressing negative externalities (the ones that would
flow from building too close to the lot line or using lower quality facade
materials, for example), but they can also readily be characterized as
mandating acts that confer positive externalities on others.
The real problem with standard land use controls relates not to the
distinction between positive and negative externalities, which is largely a
matter of framing, but rather to the way that these controls typically
operate. Traditional land use controls are primarily designed to control
cross-boundary spillovers from on-parcel activities—what I termed
“sloshes” in the earlier discussion.88 They do so by directly addressing
what can, must, and must not be done on the owned parcel. Presumed
incompatible uses are banned wholesale in particular zones (as by
separating industrial and residential uses), and specific behaviors
expected to produce spillovers (like burning trash or keeping too many
pets) are regulated at a finer grain.
Moreover, with some exceptions to be discussed below,89 land use
controls address spillovers by applying categorically across a particular
zone, neighborhood, or district. This works well in keeping everyone
within the area up to a particular standard, but there is a limit to how
much can realistically be demanded in terms of positive contributions
from residents and businesses. Requiring that everyone use premium
building materials is one thing, but creating a culture in which ideas flow
freely across firms is another. Still harder is ensuring that the participants
attracted to particular locations have the sorts of shareable ideas that will
combine in ways that generate value.
To return to the earlier terminology, “sloshes” are easy for land use
controls to address, but “sparks” are not. Sparks are harder to reach
because their impact and magnitude depend on the contributions—and
87. See, e.g., Davy, supra note 9, at 481–83 (discussing the significance of space in front of and
between buildings); Karkkainen, supra note 9, at 68-69 (noting features of the neighborhood commons,
including “the physical environment”).

88. See supra Part I.B.3
89. See infra Part III.B.3.
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hence in part on the characteristics—of other actors who are nearby in
time and space. Sparks thus represent contingent contributions to public
goods or bads—the energy of a vibrant city or the pall of a dangerous or
depressed one. Because these public goods or bads may have a “lumpy”
production function—requiring a “critical mass” to produce significant
results—relatively small differences in inputs can make large differences
in outputs, and vice versa.90 Law enforcement efforts may attempt to
break apart bad synergies (such as gangs) to leave room for good ones
(such as play groups), but some of the more economically important
positive externalities—creating a rich intellectual climate or a world
class-music scene—cannot realistically be mandated.
It might seem that the answer lies in ever more restrictive and finegrained zoning classifications that would ensure landowners are clustered
together in groupings with other landowners who will contribute to
particular agglomeration benefits. Even if governments had the necessary
information to pursue such a strategy—a doubtful proposition—there
remain two problems with this approach. The first is that the ability of a
particular industry type to contribute to a metropolitan area’s
agglomeration benefits will fluctuate over time. Focusing on just one use
cuts against a diversification strategy.91 For example, designating a
particular area of the city for automobile sales may ensure a critical mass
of such uses and create fully reciprocal positive spillovers among them.
But if the appetite for car-shopping wanes, those reciprocal spillovers
will dwindle—and the space taken up by the entire cluster within the
downtown area will begin to exert a negative impact (which is to say
lack of a positive impact) on the surrounding properties.92
A second problem with relying on zoning categories or similar
sorting techniques to push together uses that emit reciprocal positive

90. See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR, 91–110 (1978)
(discussing the dynamics of a “critical mass”); Pamela Oliver et al., A Theory of the Critical Mass. I.
Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity, and the Production of Collective Action, 91 AM. J. SOC. 522 (1985)
(same); Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of
Public-Goods Provision, 30 POL. STUD. 350, 353 (1982) (discussing “lumpy” goods).
91. See, e.g., MARSHALL, supra note 22, at IV.X.12 §3 (discussing the risks of an area relying on a
single industry and observing that this risk can be countered by developing “several distinct industries”);
Henderson, supra note 23, at 246 (noting the insurance-like quality of diversification) (quoting E.M.
HOOVER, THE LOCATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 288 (1948)).
92. Cf. Billy Graham Evangelistic Ass’n v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 117 (Minn. 2003)
(upholding historic preservation designation for area described as the past “hub of the automotive sales
district in Minneapolis”).
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externalities is more fundamental: it effectively requires that claims on
prime agglomeration space be paid for in kind with one’s own similar
agglomerative contributions. This tends toward a kind of “monoculture”
that not only heightens the concern raised above but may also impede
complementarities among different types of uses, and among firms and
households of different sizes or different positions in their life cycles.93
Although the question is an empirical one, it seems strange to think that
an efficient market would specify that all bids for preferred locations
must be made in kind by proffering one’s own identical or similar use.94
B. Alternative Strategies
If traditional land use controls perform poorly on the participant
assembly task that is at the heart of agglomeration benefits, what might
work better? The sections below consider some alternatives, ranging
from minor modifications of existing approaches to more radical ways of
restructuring property rights.
1. Supersizing
Could urban agglomerations be optimized by simply consolidating
(much) more property in the hands of a single owner? A recent paper by
Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman suggests an affirmative
answer.95 Drawing on the model of shopping malls, Parchomovsky and
Siegelman note the potential for a single owner to optimally manage
positive spillovers among heterogeneous tenants by charging differential
rents—less for an “anchor store” who brings in traffic, more for a small
operation that benefits from the anchor’s presence.96 They recommend
that local governments first condemn large blocks of land through
eminent domain and then auction off the consolidated parcels to private

93. Empircal work investigating the impact of industry diversity on urban productivity has reached
mixed results, depending on the measure of diversity employed. See, e.g., Combes & Gobillon, supra note
17, at 61, 71-72 (reviewing studies). Regardless of exactly how industry diversity plays out citywide,
however, there is reason to doubt the efficacy of a pervasive strategy of artificially constraining variety at
small urban scales. Cf. JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE, 11–22 (1998) (describing failures of tree
monoculture).
94. See generally Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 16 (discussing how land use restrictions
affect the “location market”).
95. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 6.
96. Id. at 241–45.
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parties to own and manage.97 The proposal echoes in some respects a
thought experiment that Peter Colwell once posed, in which he suggested
that zoning would be unnecessary if parties were required to own very
large tracts of land, such as a minimum of 640 acres.98
At the level of theory, the single-owner test is a useful heuristic.99 By
asking how a single owner would resolve a given land use
incompatibility if she owned all of the elements in the story (both the
polluting factory and the polluted-upon neighborhood, say), we can
derive the decisions that would obtain under zero-transaction-cost
conditions.100 It is a short logical step to the idea that supersizing
ownership holdings could reduce land use conflicts and, most relevant to
the discussion here, optimize positive interactions among complementary
uses. But consolidating ownership in this way has a number of
drawbacks.
First, although larger holdings do eliminate transaction costs in
negotiating over spillovers by simply internalizing the whole operation,
another set of problems emerges. Whether denominated as agency costs,
management costs, internal transaction costs, or something else, the costs
of internally managing the holdings of even the most talented “single
owner” are likely to prove nontrivial.101 In the present context, one of the
costs of internal management will be leaseholds, which themselves
present moral hazard issues and introduce new problems of misaligned
incentives.102 This does not mean that consolidation is necessarily the
97. Id. at 247–57. The authors also discuss the alternative of having the government retain
ownership itself. Id. at 253-55.
98. Peter F. Colwell, Tender Mercies: Efficient and Equitable Land Use Change, 25 REAL EST.
ECON. 525, 529 n.6 (1997). This approach assumes there would be some rules about what could occur near
the edges of the property. See id. The purchase of large tracts of land is of course sometimes voluntarily
sought in order to internalize positive externalities. See ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 74, at 573
(recounting Disney Corporation’s decision, after its experience with Disneyland, to assemble a tract 100
times larger for Disney World).
99. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute
to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 556–57 (1993) (describing “the test of the ‘single owner’”) .

100. See id.
101. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 48, at 16; Fred S. McChesney, Coase, Demsetz, and the Unending
Externality Debate, 26 CATO J. 179, 190–91 (2006).
102. See, e.g., Derek K.Y. Chau, Michael Firth & Bin Srinidhi, Leases with Purchase Options and
Double Moral Hazard, 33 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1390, 1391 (2006) (describing “double moral hazard” in
leasehold arrangements, with misaligned incentives for both landlord and tenant); Edward L. Glaeser,
Rethinking the Federal Bias toward Homeownership, 13:2 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 5, 6 (2011)
(suggesting ownership of a detached single-family dwelling is generally best held by the resident, because
she “is in the best position to make investments”).
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inefficient choice—we would need to know how these costs compare to
the costs of working out externalities with others, or simply leaving them
uninternalized—but it is not a magic bullet that eliminates all sources of
conflict.
Second, consolidation of property holdings can produce a variety of
social costs, including eroding competition and reducing the benefits of
specialization.103 Concentrating ownership may also mean forgoing the
local knowledge that dispersed owners can collectively possess and
employ.104 In addition, a large block of land owned by one party may
lack the diversity and eclecticism that arises organically from many
separately owned interests, and hence may be less generative of positive
benefits. In short, there are diseconomies of scale as well as economies
of scale, and large property holdings may at times introduce as many
problems as they solve. Whether this will be the case may depend in part
on the scale at which single ownership is undertaken. Because
agglomeration benefits are generated in a variety of ways at a variety of
scales, it is possible that consolidated ownership could manage relatively
small-scale micro-agglomerations105 by locating a handful of
complementary stores together, even if it could not cost-effectively
manage larger-scale agglomerations within an urban area.
Another drawback of the supersized ownership approach relates to
the start-up costs involved. Parchomovsky and Siegelman contemplate
the use of eminent domain to acquire sufficiently large tracts of land to
be managed in this manner.106 Eminent domain is costly and not always
politically feasible, even where it is legally available.107 Yet the
alternative of privately assembling land may be prohibitively costly. 108
103. See YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 51–52 (2d ed. 1997).
104. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2094 (2012) (“If only
a small number of people own property, then the property strategy loses its advantage of tapping into
dispersed local knowledge.”). Merrill notes a number of other disadvantages of concentrated ownership as
well, including dampened incentives and fewer checks against concentrated power. Id.
105. See Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 16, at 647 (distinguishing agglomeration effects that
operate at the regional level from “microagglomerations” at the scale of groups of stores or residents).
106. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 6, at 218.
107. Consider in this connection the tremendous popular backlash that followed the decision in Kelo
v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), which upheld the exercise of eminent domain against a public
use challenge.
108. This is an empirical question. For one take on the question, see Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public
Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 18–24 (2006) (suggesting private assembly may often be possible, given the ability of
private parties to assemble land secretly using buying agents).
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Holdout problems that impede land assembly might be addressed
through more fundamental revisions in property rights, as discussed
below.109 But as things stand, there are significant practical impediments
to undertaking an ownership consolidation strategy on a broad scale.
An alternative to supersizing actual ownership would be to devise a
mechanism that would entwine the fates of neighboring economic actors.
Fleshing out the forms that this approach might take is too large a task to
take on here, but one possible model might make use of derivative
instruments keyed to the market outcomes that are enjoyed or suffered by
surrounding owners. Suppose, for example, that a local government
zoned a particular district as an “interaction zone” and required all
businesses locating within it to hold derivative instruments indexed to the
stock prices of co-locating businesses and to the property values of
nearby residences.110 Businesses that expected to have net positive
impacts on their neighbors would have an extra incentive to locate in
such a zone, while those who would derive benefits from others without
contributing positively to the area would effectively pay a premium for
locating there. The result might be an assembly pattern that is closer to what
a single owner would produce, without the associated drawbacks of
consolidated ownership.
2. Paying for buzz
Where it is possible to identify a particular economic actor who
produces asymmetric benefits for neighbors, a different strategy is
possible—that of directly charging nearby parties for the benefits that
they receive. In general, the law does not require payments from those
who receive gratuitous benefits from others, apart from a few narrow
109. See supra Part II.B.5.
110. A great number of operational details and safeguards would have to be hammered out, from
determining appropriate stakes, to preventing parties from hedging the risk associated with the required
stakes, to ensuring that the approach did not produce or perpetuate discriminatory behavior or patterns. The
idea of requiring stakes as a way of aligning incentives is not wholly unprecedented. See, e.g., David M.
Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 440 (2000) (discussing potential of stock options in executive compensation to produce incentive
compatibility where hedging is absent); see also Gideon Parchomovsky & Endre Stavang, The
Environmental
Option,
99
MINN.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2014)
available
at
http://www.cree.uio.no/publications/2013_3/Stavang_ The_Environmental_Option_CREE_WP3_2013.pdf
(proposing a model in which large companies might be required to take a stake in “green” enterprises); Lee
Anne Fennell & Julie A. Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 143, 174–75 (2010)
(describing a model in which neighboring jurisdictions would share risk by buying instruments indexed to
each other’s property values).
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categories of restitution.111 Ariel Porat argues for an Expanded Duty of
Restitution (EDR) that would require payments from those who receive
unrequested benefits in a broader set of circumstances.112 If such
payments were mandatory, the argument runs, then more activities that
produce positive externalities would be encouraged.
Whatever merits such an idea might have in cases where a single
actor engages in a discrete act that produces plainly valuable benefits for
identifiable others, it is unlikely to offer much traction in addressing
urban agglomerations.113 Perhaps the most promising urban application
would be where a unique economic entity such as an entertainment
venue nonreciprocally generates benefits for the surrounding community
that, for practical reasons, cannot be internalized. But courts have shown
themselves unwilling to provide such venues with recourse against even
those near neighbors who purposefully capture spillovers for commercial
gain. In an 1886 case, for example, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected
the Detroit Base-Ball Club’s claim for injunctive relief against a neighbor
who erected viewing stands that allowed his customers to observe games
without paying admission.114 A similar scenario was presented in an
Australian case, Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co. v.
Taylor.115 There, the High Court rejected the idea of “property in a
spectacle” and declined to enjoin radio broadcasts carried out from
premises overlooking an open-air horse racing facility.116
The law is understandably reluctant to allow an enterprise that has
failed to contain its own spillovers to restrict what nearby landowners
can do with those spillovers. Line-drawing and measurement problems

111. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
112. Porat, supra note 46, at 205–14.
113. Porat places a number of limits on the domain of his proposed EDR so that it would not apply
in, inter alia, categories of cases where the risk of overvaluation or costs of enforcement are unduly high.
See id. at 226. Presumably these conditions would rule out the use of the EDR to sort out complex urban
agglomeration benefits, although Porat does discuss applying EDR in instances in which the acts of one
party increase the property value of another. See e.g., id. at 191 (providing an example in which a property
owner will not construct a park that would also benefit his neighbors unless the neighbors cover some of
the costs).
114. Detroit Base-Ball Club v. Deppert, 27 N.W. 856, 858 (Mich. 1886); see also ELLICKSON ET AL.,
supra note 74, at 572–73 (noting the general inability of landowners to recover for positive externalities
they create).
115. (1937) 58 C.L.R. 479 (Austl.); see Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 252
passim (1991) (examining connections between property theory and the analysis in Victoria Park Racing).
116. See Victoria Park Racing, 58 C.L.R. at 492-97 (Latham, C.J.); see also Gray, supra note 115,
at 268.
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abound. Urban areas contain elaborate webs of interdependencies that
confound causal inferences about who benefited (or harmed) whom.117
Rarely will there be just one “anchor tenant” who provides vast
nonreciprocal benefits in roughly equal measure to all surrounding
owners. Instead, there will likely be a series of unique uses that not only
emit different levels of positive and negative externalities but are also
enjoyed by nearby landowners at varying levels, and are reciprocated in
varying and greatly unequal degrees by those surrounding owners. A
more intricate system of payments for positive and negative externalities
could be imagined, although finding a workable way to administer it
would be highly challenging.118 At some point, however, the opportunity
costs of foregone agglomerations may be large enough to justify the
considerable costs of attempting to pin down and compensate for certain
asymmetric impacts.119
3. Differential pricing
Another way local governments could address agglomeration costs
and benefits would be by applying differential pricing to land uses and
land users. Differential pricing is a common mechanism where
participant assembly is important. Consider, for example, its use in
higher education to bring together a desired mix of students—some
students are charged full freight, while others receive various amounts in
scholarships, stipends, and other assistance that allows them to attend at
reduced or even negative prices.120
Land use authorities already have access to what amounts to
differential pricing to the extent that they are free to strike individualized
bargains with landowners about land uses.121 Their ability to do so is
117. In Detroit Base-Ball Club, for example, the defendent contended that the neighboring ball
field had also interfered with the quiet use of his land. 27 N.W. at 857.
118. See T. Nicolaus Tideman, Integrating Land-Value Taxation with the Internalization of Spatial
Externalities, 66 LAND ECON. 341, 341 (1990) (“An ideal system would not only match the external benefit
or cost [of a landowner’s activities] with a subsidy or tax, but would also collect money to finance the
subsidies, and distribute the proceeds of the taxes collected, according to the impacts of the externalities.”).
119. See Demsetz, supra note 56.

120. See, e.g., Rothschild & White, supra note 14.
121. These deals generally fall under the general rubric of land use exactions or impact fees. See,
e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 478–83 (1991). Such devices might be viewed as charging
for the negative impacts that the use will inflict on the surrounding community or as collecting for the
positive benefits that existing infrastructure will provide. See id. at 482–83.
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arguably impeded, however, by the doctrinal limits on bargaining laid out
in Nollan and Dolan, and recently (and quite confusingly) reinforced and
extended in Koontz.122 The selective determination of development
“prices” based on each landowner’s contributions to agglomeration
benefits may be especially hard to square with doctrine.123 Perhaps the
growing significance of agglomeration economies to economic value will
eventually create pressure to relax the doctrine, however, permitting
more value-enhancing trades.124 Other ways of effectively altering prices
include using eminent domain to allow certain projects to go forward and
offering tax breaks to particular parties.125
Sometimes differential pricing occurs not by explicitly setting a

122. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), required an “essential nexus”
between the exaction and the rationale for the land use restriction that was lifted in exchange for it. Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), added the requirement of “rough proportionality” between the
impacts that the land use restriction would control and the exaction. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management Dist, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013), held that these limits apply to monetary exactions as well as
physical ones, and that the prohibition extends to bargaining efforts that do not actually result in any money
or land changing hands. It is unclear to what extent these limits have actually blocked desired deals, as
opposed to simply channeling them (at some positive cost) to repeat players or through particular
procedural hoops. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75
N.C. L. REV. 1243, 1286–99 (1997) (positing that exactions restrictions will benefit repeat players who can
be trusted not to sue); FISCHEL, supra note 65, at 67 (suggesting developers will choose to pay—or
“donate”—rather than litigate). The expanded domain of heightened scrutiny ushered in by Koontz may
also matter less in practice than anticipated, depending on the remedies that are applied (an issue the
Supreme Court did not decide). See Rick Hills, Koontz’s Unintelligible Takings Rule: Can Remedial
Equivocation Save the Court from a Doctrinal Quagmire? PRAWFSBLAWG (June 25, 2013, 3:41 PM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/06/koontzs-unintelligible-takings-rule-can-remedialequivocation-make-up-for-an-incoherent-substantive-.html.
123. Koontz left open precisely how the monetary exactions subject to heightened scrutiny under
Nollan and Dolan would be distinguished from ordinary taxes and fees. One possibility would be to apply
heightened scrutiny only to adjudicative types of exactions imposed on a case-by-case basis, and not to
legislatively imposed exactions. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting this possible
distinction, which some state courts have embraced). Even if this refinement were adopted, however, it
would not help to facilitate the kind of price discrimination contemplated in the text, unless good proxies
for contributions to agglomeration could be built into a legislatively enacted schedule of fees. For related
discussions see, for example, Hills & Schleicher, supra note 67 at 53–59; Levine-Schnur, supra note 60, at
162–60 (discussing factors that might be evaluated in an “urban impact assessment” to determine
contributions and suggesting ways in which discretion might be calibrated).
124. On the other hand, there may be substantial uncertainty about the degree to which differential
pricing carried out by a local governmental entity would produce the social optimum, given potential
information and incentive problems.
125. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Reframing Eminent Domain: Unsupported Advocacy, Ambiguous
Economics, and the Case for a New Public Use Test, 32 VT. L. REV. 129 (2007) (explaining how eminent
domain lowers land assembly costs for developers, and noting other methods, such as subsidies, for
similarly reducing the cost of development).
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variety of monetary prices for different participants, but implicitly by
setting in-kind conditions that are cheaper or more expensive for certain
categories of participants to fulfill. Consider in this connection the
requirements under the Homestead Act, which made living on and
working the land for a period of time a condition of perfecting title. 126
Similarly, concert ticket pricing typically combines a below-marketclearing price with an in-kind charge—standing in a queue. If those who
are willing to stand in a queue are, on average, better audience members
than those who are simply willing to pay a higher price, the two-part
pricing will work better at participant assembly than a market-clearing
price.127
Similar approaches might be attempted in urban contexts. For
example, certain neighborhoods by virtue of their “edginess” may screen
out certain populations while attracting others. Although this often
happens in an unplanned manner, governments can intentionally embed
uses and amenities that will produce self-selection effects, or allow
developers to do so.128 To take a small-scale example, simply removing
parking facilities from a beach area will have an impact on the number
and type of beachgoers, and the activities that they undertake.129

126. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 931, 960–61 (1985) (discussing self-selection in the context of the Homestead Acts).
127. See, e.g., Lutz-Alexander Busch & Phil Curry, Ticket Pricing and the Impression of Excess
Demand, 111 ECON. LETTERS 40 (2011) (presenting a two-part pricing model for event tickets in which
fans of higher quality have a lower cost of lining up, allowing the line-up to perform a quality-screening
function); Allan C. DeSerpa, To Err Is Rational: A Theory of Excess Demand for Tickets, 15 MANAGERIAL
& DECISION ECON. 511, 515–17 (1994) (presenting a concert pricing model in which “the highest-demand
buyers in terms of money price will generally not be the ‘best audience’ in their own estimation”).
128. See GARY S. BECKER & KEVIN M. MURPHY, SOCIAL ECONOMICS: MARKET BEHAVIOR IN A
SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 72 (2000) (noting the possibility that governments use amenity choice to shape
demographics); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L.
REV. 437 (2006) (discussing the use of “exclusionary amenities” in private residential communities). Some
of the strategies Richard Florida proposed for attracting and retaining the “creative class” would fall in this
category as well. See generally RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS (2002). Florida’s
thesis has been the subject of significant criticism. See, e.g., Michele Hoyman & Christopher Faricy, It
Takes a Village: A Test of the Creative Class, Social Capital, and Human Capital Theories, 44 URB. AFF.
REV. 311, 329 (2009) (finding no relationship between the presence of a creative class and “job growth,
growth in wages, or absolute levels of wages” and finding a negative correlation between measures of the
creative class and other economic measures); Jamie Peck, Struggling with the Creative Class, 29 INT’L J.
URB. & REG’L RESEARCH 740 (2005) (discussing and critiquing Florida’s thesis). As these critiques
suggest, the ability of communities to successfully pursue agglomeration benefits through strategies aimed
at selection effects would depend on their having good empirical information about the impacts of those
strategies.
129. Scarce parking would weed out visitors who prefer to drive, and might reduce the spontaneous

135

AGGLOMERAMA NOV DRAFT CLEAN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/30/2014 9:57 PM

201x

Requiring that beachgoers make it to the beach by walking or biking
imposes an in-kind tax that automatically filters the population; it might
produce a beach full of people who are more fit, on average, than if the
beach is made accessible by private automobile. But such requirements
might also produce an underutilized beach under some plausible
assumptions.
If the goal is not just to prevent overcrowding but to produce optimal
usage of an area and to make it a locus of interesting interactions, then
too few users (of the right sort) is as bad as too many.130 Whatever filters
are put in place to control access must not be so stringent as to stymie
production of the shared experience, nor so loose as to degrade its
quality. It is also essential to ensure that such approaches do not become
back-door mechanisms for discrimination along forbidden dimensions.131
Giving close attention to in-kind pricing can both open up new
possibilities and reveal the ways in which such strategies are already
(perhaps unwittingly) being employed. Awareness of these approaches is
especially important given normative concerns about certain incarnations
of them.
4. Revising zoning
Traditional Euclidian zoning, the type in use in nearly all
communities above a certain size, operates by specifying uses that are
permitted in particular zones, and banning all others.132 This approach
formation of crowds. Likewise, increasing the proportion of people who arrive by bicycle or mass transit,
and who therefore cannot conveniently carry tents, grills, and other bulky items, may change the activities
and average length of time spent at the beach. These issues have come to the forefront in a recent debate
over reducing parking at a popular Chicago beach, a move considered following a large illegal concert held
there. See John Keilman, Architect’s Montrose Beach Plan Would Sacrifice Parking, CHI. TRIB., July 23,
2014, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-montrose-beach-improvementplan-20140723-story.html. The intentional manipulation of amenities to exclude populations from public
beaches has at times taken reprehensible forms. See ROBERT A. CARO: THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT
MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK 318-19 (1974) (describing Robert Moses’s efforts to exclude lowincome and African-American families from Jones Beach by, among other things, limiting public
transportation to the beach and charging high parking fees); see also LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ,
INFORMATION AND EXCLUSION 193-95 (2011) (discussing Moses’s exclusionary tactics).
130. See, e.g., MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY 32–37 (2008) (discussing the problem
of underuse in connection with the anticommons); Rose, supra note 5 at 769 (noting the need to encourage
certain forms of participation).
131. See, e.g., BECKER & MURPHY, supra note 128, at 72; STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 129;
Strahilevitz, supra note 128.
132. The zoning scheme upheld in Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926), was cumulative in
nature: each successive zoning category allowed increasingly intensive uses, but continued to permit the
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does not deal well with the challenges of agglomeration. But other forms
of zoning might carry more promise in this regard. Performance zoning
focuses not on uses but rather on their impacts, such as certain decibel
readings or pollutant concentrations detected outside the owned parcel.133
While usually considered in the context of negative externalities like
noise or emissions, performance zoning would be interesting to consider
in the context of positive externalities.
Suppose, for example, that cameras or other technologies could
determine the number of trips on foot to a given store from outside of a
fixed radius of, say, a couple blocks. In a “high foot traffic” zone, new
uses might be permitted only if they can guarantee (say by posting a
bond) that they will draw a certain amount of foot traffic into the area on
average, over a particular span of time. In areas where only a few stores
are likely to serve as “magnets” that draw in foot traffic, designating
entire zones might not be desirable; instead, special exceptions for larger
or denser uses might be granted to those willing and able to meet this
output target.
As another example, suppose that knowledge spillovers comprise the
primary desired agglomeration benefits. Here, zoning might specify that
uses locating in the area have a certain minimum average number of
employees on site each workday, thereby discouraging companies from
adopting liberal work-from-home policies. More intrusively, targets
could even be set for such matters as employees consuming meals in the
immediate area, perhaps through a subsidy program.134 Such
less intensive uses that were allowed in the more exclusive zoning categories. Modern zoning is often
noncumulative, generating mutually exclusive realms for different uses. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
PROPERTY 979 (8th ed. 2014) (distinguishing cumulative from noncumulative zoning). The choice between
cumulative and noncumulative zoning could carry significant implications for agglomeration economies.
See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using Noncumulative Zoning to
Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 262–67 (2010).
133. See, e.g., JANE JACOBS, DARK AGE AHEAD, 153–57 (2004) (discussing a “performance code”
focused on impacts); DOUGLAS R. PORTER ET AL., FLEXIBLE ZONING: HOW IT WORKS 11 (1988)
(explaining how performance zoning in pure form focuses solely on impacts rather than uses); Frederick
W. Acker, Note, Performance Zoning, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363 (1991) (discussing rationales for and
types of performance zoning). Performance zoning has not been widely used to date, which can likely be
attributed to monitoring difficulties. It is possible that technological advances could be harnessed to make
the use of performance zoning more viable. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Crowdsourcing Land Use, 78
BROOK. L. REV. 385, 391–96 (2013).
134. Subsidized meals are a very common way to encourage interaction. See, e.g., Prospective
Students,
Academic
Culture,
THE
UNIVERSITY
OF
CHICAGO
LAW
SCHOOL,
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/prospective/academicculture (last visited Oct. 15, 2014) (“Learning through
lunch is a tradition at Chicago.”).
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performance standards would be easier to meet for firms whose business
model involves on-site employees. Although it would not necessarily
attract the companies that would contain the highest quality community
contributors, it would at least ensure that some of the ingredients for
interaction—workers—are present.
Similarly, some communities have attempted to use covenants or
zoning to restrict residential occupancy to those who will be present on a
relatively long-term basis.135 Presumably, such restrictions are motivated
by views about the positive and negative spillovers produced by
properties that are mostly left vacant or that experience high turnover as
compared with those that are continuously occupied by the same parties.
Drawing on the discussion above, zoning might also seek to more
directly address energy/clog ratios, perhaps through scoring systems that
examine factors like traffic impacts, foot traffic, commuting and parking
patterns of the workers, and so on, in conjunction with the space
requirements of the use. Particular uses that are thought to be especially
important to the city’s life can also be directly encouraged, as some
communities have done in setting aside housing for artists.136 Transect
zoning represents a somewhat similar idea: it focuses on the types of
buildings that will appear in different areas of a city, letting land use
follow form rather than the other way around.137 But building forms are
at best a rough proxy for the kinds of considerations that are most
important to agglomeration economies and diseconomies; a better
approach would be to focus directly on the latter—if local governments
can determine what they are and how to advance them.
5. Rethinking everlasting, rooted estates

135. See, e.g., Natalie Sherman, Weekly Rentals in cean City May Be Outlawed, BALT. SUN, Aug.
16, 2014, available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-08-16/business/bs-bz-ocean-city-rentals20140816_1_short-term-rentals-weekly-rentals-planning-and-zoning-commission; TOWN OF NANTUCKET,
MASS. ZONING CODE § 139-2(A)(5) (2009), available at http://ecode360.com/11471475 (requiring that
occupancy of accessory apartments “be limited to natural persons domiciled in the Town of Nantucket year
round and that the dwelling may not be offered for nor used for seasonal occupancy”).
136. See,
e.g.,
ArtistSpace
Housing,
BOSTON
REDEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY,
http://www.bostonredevelopmentauthority.org/housing/artist-housing/artistspace-housing-overview
(last
visited Oct. 15, 2014).
137. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Redeeming Transect Zoning, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 571, 575–76 (2013)
(explaining that “transect zoning permits a wide variety of land uses throughout a community, so long as
these uses are carried out in buildings that are appropriate in size and design to the zone where they are
located”) (footnote omitted).
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A final set of ideas, which I am developing further in separate work,
strikes at the heart of existing property forms. The assumption that
property rights must be granted in physically rooted locations and be
perpetual in length should be rethought in light of the sea change that has
transpired over recent centuries in how property generates value.
Building optional forms of impermanence and portability into tenure
forms could offer important new avenues for restructuring property
rights.
Consider first the possibility of a less permanent estate that would
(unlike a leasehold) embody the other features of full ownership, but that
would be expressly “callable” by the government after a certain period of
time.138 Already, governments hold call options insofar as eminent
domain can truncate rights of private landowners. Creating estates that
are impermanent by design and enabling local governments to designate
areas in which these callable estates will be located would provide a
great deal more flexibility. It would also enable parties to sort into more
or less permanent property rights arrangements, depending on their
preferences. By making redevelopment easier in certain areas, such an
approach would be expected to reduce resort to eminent domain in other
areas.
A second idea would loosen the usual assumption that real property
interests must be tied to a particular physical location. Suppose, for
example, that parties in urban areas could purchase “floating estates” of a
particular value, with particular attributes, on the understanding that their
property interest might be physically moved to a different location within
a defined zone at some later time,with relocation costs covered.
As unusual as this may sound, there are antecedents. Land
readjustment, although not well-known in the United States, has been
used in other countries to accomplish something very similar to this
idea.139 Instead of simply condemning private property through eminent

138. Such a property interest could take the form of a fee simple subject to executory limitation. See,
e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 290–92 (8th ed. 2014) (defining and describing these estates). The
trigger conditions for the executory interest might be tied to certain economic or social indicators that
suggest the appropriateness of redevelopment, to the passage of a certain amount of time, or both. Such an
approach could work entirely within existing tenure forms, consistent with the numerus clausus principle.
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 26 (2000).
139. See, e.g., Yu-Hung Hong, Assembling Land for Urban Development: Issues and Opportunities,
in ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT: ECONOMICS, LAW, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 3, 23–24 (Yu-Hung
Hong & Barrie Needham eds., 2007) (describing reallocation methods). Although approaches vary
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domain, land readjustment displaces parties from their original locations
but grants them equally valuable land parcels in the redeveloped area or
shares in the enterprises that their displacement made possible.
Acceptance for this approach might be higher if, instead of simply
placing all landowners at risk of such a land swap, parties could choose
to purchase land that would be subject to such an arrangement in the
future. Again, the goal would be to increase both security and flexibility
by enabling people to opt into arrangements that diverge from the
traditional rooted, perpetual fee simple.
CONCLUSION
Agglomeration economies are already central to how property
generates value, and will become even more important going forward.
Urbanization has fundamentally changed the way in which property is
used, and has dramatically increased the degree of interdependence
among land users and land uses. It is important that commons scholars
begin unpacking the nature of the dilemmas that this global trend has
created and start finding ways to adapt existing property tools—or invent
new ones—to address these new challenges. I hope this essay offers a
step in that direction.

considerably, the basic idea can be illustrated by imagining a low-density residential neighborhood that
would be more valuable if it were replaced with a higher-density mixed-use development. The area might
be razed and redeveloped with higher-density residences, shops, and green space. Each former resident
might then receive a smaller residential site in the new development, but because of the effects of the new
development, it would be of equal or greater value than the property she was initially required to give up.
For more background on this approach and its many variations, see generally ANALYZING LAND
READJUSTMENT, supra; George W. Liebmann, Land Readjustment for America: A Proposal for a Statute,
32 URB. LAW. 1 (2000).
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